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ABSTRACT
Outsourcing data to remote storage servers has become more
and more popular, but the related security and privacy con-
cerns have also been raised. To protect the pattern in which
a user accesses the outsourced data, various oblivious RAM
(ORAM) systems have been proposed. However, existing
ORAM designs assume a single user or a group of mutually-
trusted users to access a remote storage, which makes them
inapplicable to many practical scenarios where multiple users
share data but may not trust each other. Even if the data-
sharing users do trust each other, such systems are vulner-
able to the compromise of even a single user. To study the
feasibility and costs for overcoming the limitation of existing
ORAMs in multi-user scenarios, this paper proposes a new
type of ORAM system calledMulti-user ORAM (M-ORAM).
The key idea is to introduce a new component, i.e., a chain of
anonymizers, to act as a common proxy between users and
the storage server. M-ORAM can protect the data access
pattern of each individual user from others as long as not all
anonymizers are compromised. Extensive security and over-
head analysis has been conducted to quantify the strength of
the scheme in protecting an individual user’s access pattern
and the costs incurred to provide the protection.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent development of cloud computing has witnessed
the convenience of remote storage services. Many online
storage providers are offering large amount of inexpensive
storage space to individual and enterprise users. Users can
outsource their data and access them remotely from their re-
source restricted devices in a pay-per-use manner.
Although a user may encrypt outsourced data to protect
confidentiality of the data content, her pattern in accessing
the data remains unprotected and may reveal the user’s pri-
vate information. The emerging oblivious RAM (ORAM)
techniques [1, 3–7, 9–14] have been proposed to protect a
user’s access pattern privacy, however, with restrictions. One
of the fundamental restrictions is that all existing ORAM
schemes essentially assume only a single user to the remote
storage. Even though multi-user ORAM schemes have been
proposed in [6, 13], the users essentially work together as a
single user, because they share secret keys with each other
and thus they must trust each other in order to share the re-
mote storage. In practice, users who share a data storage
(e.g., file system or data base) may not trust each other. Even
if they do, compromising just one of them can easily jeopar-
dize the all.
For instance, a hospital may wish to export the encrypted
information of all its patients, to a remote storage organized
as an ORAM. To allow each doctor to access the data of any
patient who has visited the hospital, all the doctors should
share secret keys and appear as a single user to the remote
storage. Such a system, however, may violate patient-doctor
privacy. As an example, the pattern in which a patient vis-
its a doctor, which shall be kept confidential between the
patient and the doctor, may now be observed by other doc-
tors through observing this doctor’s pattern in accessing the
data from the remote storage. Moreover, if the account of a
doctor is compromised by an outsider, the outsider can also
observe the accesses made by all other doctors.
To study the feasibility and cost for overcoming the above
limitation of existing ORAM systems, we propose, design,
and analyze a new type of ORAM system called Multi-user
ORAM (M-ORAM), with which (i) multiple users can share
a remote storage, and meanwhile (ii) the access pattern of
each individual user can be well protected from other users
or the storage server. To the best of our knowledge, this is
first design to accomplish the above goals.
The key idea in our design is to introduce a chain of col-
laborative but mutually-independent anonymizers between
users and the storage server. When a user needs to query
a data item, its request and the storage server’s replies shall
pass through and be processed by the anonymizers before
they reach the storage server or the user. In practice, the
anonymizers can be implemented as mutually-independent
hardware components (e.g., computers) or software compo-
nents (e.g., virtual machines) provided in public or private
domains. For instance, in the afore-mentioned “hospital” ex-
ample, the anonymizers can be implemented as several phys-
ical/virtual machines running in the premise of the hospital
or some cloud providers independent of the provider of the
remote storage server.
Within this architecture, (i) users do not need to share se-
crets as they do not interact independently with the shared
1
storage server; (ii) each user sets up a secure and logically
isolated communication channel with the chain of anonymiz-
ers; (iii) multiple anonymizers, each holding an indepen-
dent share of the system-wide secret, work together to act
as a proxy between users and the storage server, and also
take non-user-specific workload (e.g., data shuffling). Due
to the above features, users are securely isolated from each
other, compromising some but not all anonymizers cannot
capture the system-wide secret, and therefore the system can
be more privacy-preserving and secure. Our design is based
on a customized ORAM system. The system follows the
framework of existing hierarchical, bucket-based, and hash-
based ORAMs [1,3,7], with a few modifications to facilitate
the implementation of the afored-described ideas.
Extensive security analysis has been conducted to quan-
tify the strength of the system in protecting users’ data ac-
cess pattern. Overhead analysis has also been provided to
quantify the costs incurred to provide the protection. Com-
pared to the single-user ORAM with the best-known perfor-
mance [7], our design yields
 a lower communication overhead per query by the user:
O(logN log logN) vs. O

log2N
log logN

;
 a higher communication overhead (amortized per query)
for data shuffling per anonymizer:
O(log3N log logN) vs. O

log2N
log logN

;
 a moderately increased local cache at the user:
O(logN log logN) vs. O(1).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: System
model and design goal are introduced in Section 2. Sections
3 and 4 elaborate the design details. The results of security
and overhead analysis are reported in Sections 5 and 6, re-
spectively. Section 7 provides a brief comparison to related
works. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. SYSTEMMODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
2.1 System Models
Multiple users, who may not trust each other, shareN data
items, which are exported to an un-trusted storage server.
Let Fp be a finite field of p distinct elements, where p is a
large prime number. LetGp be a multiplicative, cyclic group
with also p distinct elements. Hence, for any element g 2
Gp, elements g0; g1; g2;    ; gp 1 should all belong to G.
Each data item, denoted as Di, consists of two components:
a unique data ID and the data content that is a sequence of
elements of Gp. As the operations on each element of the
sequence are the same, we focus our study on the operations
on a single element in this work. In practice, operations on a
realistic data content are simply a sequence of operations on
each element of the data content. Hereafter, each data item
Di is represented as (gi; di), where gi 2 Gp is the data ID
and di 2 Gp is the data content.
The server provides the raw storage services of storing
and fetching data items with the following two primitives:
 store(data; pos) to store data at physical address pos;
 fetch(pos) to retrieve data from physical address pos.
Moreover, there is a system initialization server that is
trusted by all the users. It is not involved in data access,
but only responsible for initializing the system and initializ-
ing a user when the user joins the system. Therefore, it does
not need to stay online after the system starts, and thus is
assumed to be immune from attacks.
2.2 Design Goal and Our Approach
A number of oblivious RAM (ORAM) schemes [1, 3–5,
7, 9–12, 14] have been proposed to protect the data access
pattern of a user from the storage server. But these schemes
only consider the situation when there is only a single user
in the system, and thus cannot be applied when there exist
multiple users who may not trust each other. The situation
becomes even more challenging if users can collude with the
storage server.
Our design goal is to protect the data access pattern of
each user of a multi-user storage system from being revealed
to the storage server or other users. To attain this goal,
we propose a new architecture (as shown in Figure 1) com-
posed of a hierarchical storage server, multiple users, and a
chain of anonymizers as a bridge between users and the stor-
age server. In practice, anonymizers can be implemented as
mutually-independent hardware components (e.g., comput-
ers) or software components (e.g., virtual servers).
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Figure 1: System overview.
Specifically, the introduced chain of anonymizers serves
as a common proxy for all users to access data at the storage
server as follows.
 When a user needs to access certain data items, its
request and the data replied from the storage server
should pass through and be processed by the anonymiz-
ers before they reach the storage server or the user.
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 With such a proxy to protect users from direct interac-
tions with the storage server, each individual user does
not need to maintain the information about storage lo-
cations or encryption keys of the data shared with other
users. Without exposing such knowledge to individual
users, it becomes possible to prevent a user from learn-
ing other users’ data access patterns through observing
their interactions with the storage server.
 Such an architecture also allows each user to establish
secure and logically isolated communication channel
with the chain of anonymizers, which makes it possible
to prevent a user from learning other users’ data access
patterns through observing their interactions with the
anonymizers.
 As the proxy consists of multiple collaborative but in-
dependent anonymizers, the access pattern privacy of
users can still be under protection as long as not all of
the anonymizers have been compromised.
Under the proposed architecture, appropriate algorithms
must be designed to guide the interactions between the stor-
age server, anonymizers, and users. For readability, we de-
scribe the algorithms in two steps in the following sections.
We first introduce a customized ORAM (C-ORAM), in which
the anonymizers and users are treated as a virtual single user
of the storage server, and the interactions between this vir-
tual single user and the storage server are specified. Then,
we present the complete scheme, called multi-user obliv-
ious RAM (M-ORAM), in which the detailed interactions
between the users and anonymizers are elaborated under the
umbrella of C-ORAM.
3. A CUSTOMIZED ORAM
This section presents a customized ORAM (C-ORAM)
that specifies the interactions between the storage server and
the rest of the system (i.e., the anonymizers and users, which
are treated as a virtual single user).
3.1 System Initialization
Similar to several existing ORAMs [1, 10], C-ORAM or-
ganizes the storage as a hierarchy of buckets:
 The hierarchy consists of T + 1 layers, where T =
dlogN   log(logN log logN)e   1.
 Each layer l (l = 0;    ; T ) has l buckets where l =
2l+1 logN log logN . Hence, the top layer of the hi-
erarchy (i.e., layer 0) has 2 logN log logN buckets,
while the bottom layer of the hierarchy (i.e., layer T )
has at least N buckets.
 Each layer l is associated with a public hash function,
denoted as Hl(:), which maps each element of group
Gp to two integers uniformly at random between 0 and
l   1, i.e., two of the l buckets at layer l.
 Each bucket can contain up to B = 4 log logN data
items.
 A counter is maintained for each bucket to track the
number of data items stored at the bucket.
The single user of C-ORAM is preloaded with two keys
x(l) and y(l) for each layer l. Here, a key is an element of
Fp n f0g and the encryption of an element g 2 Gp with a
key k is gk 2 Gp. Initially, the user encrypts and exports
all N data items to the bottom layer of storage hierarchy
(i.e., layer T ) at the storage server. For example, for each
data item Di = (gi; di), where gi 2 Gp is the data ID and
di 2 Gp is the data content, it is encrypted with x(T ) and
y(T ) to obtain

g
x(T )
i ; d
y(T )
i

, and then exported to one of
the two buckets produced byHT

g
x(T )
i

.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the interactions between the
single user and the storage server in C-ORAM. As shown
in the figure, to obtain a desired data item from the stor-
age server, C-ORAM operates in the following three phases:
data query, data uploading, and data shuffling.
3.2 Phase 1: Data Query
LetDi = (gi; di) denote the desired data item. To obtain
it from the storage, C-ORAM executes the data query phase
in an iterative manner at each nonempty layer l of the storage
hierarchy from the top layer l = 0 to the bottom layer l = T .
Each iteration consists of six steps from [Q1] to [Q6].
[Q1] The user computes the encrypted ID gx(l)i .
[Q2] The user computes the positions pos0 and pos1 of the
buckets that may contain the desired data item:
(pos0; pos1)  Hl

g
x(l)
i

:
[Q3: Bitmap Retrieval] This step is to retrieve the bitmap
that will be used by the user to decide the buckets to request.
To facilitate the presentation, we introduce the following no-
tations:
a = min

2l; 8 log logN(4 log logN + 1)
	
logN log logN;
and
b =

l
a

;
where l is the number of buckets at layer l.
If Di has already been found at a layer higher than l, the
user generates two integers c0 and c1 uniformly at random
from f0;    ; b   1g; otherwise, c0 = pos0 mod b and
c1 = pos1 mod b. In case the above procedure produces
the same value for c0 and c1, the user re-generates c1 uni-
formly at random from f0;    ; b 1gnfc0g. Then, the user
requests the storage server to return a bitmap of 2a bits to
indicate the emptiness of the buckets at positions c0 + b  i
and c1 + b  i for i = 0;    ; a  1. Note that the 2a queried
3
User Server
Bucket  Query
D
a
ta
 R
e
q
u
est
D
a
ta
 R
e
p
ly
D
a
ta
 U
p
lo
a
d
in
g
D
a
ta
 S
h
u
fflin
g
:
1
Q
))((),(
10
IDEHpospos u=
:
3
Q
)( IDE u
Bitmap  Retrieval
:
4
Q
:
5
Q
D
a
ta
 Q
u
e
ry
 (ite
ra
tiv
e
ly
 fo
r ea
c
h
 n
o
n
-em
p
ty
 la
y
e
r)
)(dataEu
:U )(dataEu
:
2
Q
Obtain desired data:
6
Q
Select the layer to be shuffled
Shuffle the selected layer
Figure 2: C-ORAM overview.
positions must include the positions of the buckets whereDi
may be stored, if Di has not been found yet. The emptiness
of these buckets will be used in the next step to decide which
buckets should be retrieved. Furthermore, as to be shown in
Section 5.1.2, the above a value ensures that the probabil-
ity for all queried positions to be empty is negligible, which
guarantees negligibly low probability of failure in running
the query scheme.
[Q4: Bucket Request] The user selects the buckets to re-
quest based on the retrieved bitmap as follows:
 If Di has already been found at a layer higher than l,
then for each x 2 f0; 1g, the user randomly picks a
nonempty position from cx + bt, t 2 f0;    ; a  1g
to request.
 Otherwise, for each x 2 f0; 1g, if the bucket at po-
sition posx is nonempty, the bucket is requested; else,
the user randomly picks a nonempty position from cx+
bt, t 2 f0;    ; a  1g to request.
[Q5: Data Reply] In response to the request, the storage
server returns all the encrypted data items at the requested
buckets directly to the user.
[Q6: Obtain Desired Data] For each returned data item, the
user uses keys x(l) and y(l) to decrypt its ID and content. If
a data item has an ID of gi, the desired access is performed
to the data content; otherwise, the data item is stored tem-
porarily in a local cache at the user.
3.3 Phase 2: Data Uploading
After all nonempty layers have been queried and the de-
sired data item has been accessed, all the returned data items
are re-encrypted and then uploaded to the storage server.
Specifically, the user picks a new pair of keys x(l) and y(l)
uniformly at random from Fp, and re-encrypts each returned
data item with these keys. Then, the re-encrypted data items
are uploaded in an arbitrary order to a temporary shuffling
buffer at the storage server.
3.4 Phase 3: Data Shuffling
Suppose Sl denote the dataset from layer l and S denote
the data in the shuffling buffer. Data shuffling is conducted
as follows.
Algorithm 1 Data Shuffling in C-ORAM
S1: Determine Shuffling Layer
1: l := 0
2: S := S [ S0
3: while l < jSj do
4: S := S [ Sl+1
5: l := l + 1
6: end while
7: ls := l
S2: Data Encryption
8: forDi 2 S do
9: user.Download(S,Di)
10: D0i := user.Transform((Di;
x(ls)
x(l)
;
y(ls)
y(l)
)
11: Eu(D0i) := user.Encrypt(D0i, u)
12: user.Upload(S, Eu(D0i))
13: end for
S3: Data Sorting
14: user.Obliviously-Sort(S)
S4: Data Decryption
15: forD0i 2 S do
16: user.Download(S, Eu(D0i))
17: D0i := user.Decrypt(D0i, u)
18: user.Upload(S,D0i)
19: end for
S5: Server Locates Data into Buckets
20: Server.Map(ls, S)
[S1] Determine the layer for which data shuffling should be
performed. As a rule, shuffling should be performed for
layer ls > 0 only if (i) the number of data items in the shuf-
fling buffer and at layers 0,    , ls   1 is greater than or
equal to the total number of buckets at layer ls   1, and (ii)
the number of data items in the shuffling buffer and at layers
0,    , ls is less than the total number of buckets at layer ls.
[S2] All data items at layers 0,    , ls should be updated
such that the ID of each data item becomes encrypted by
x(ls) and the content of each data item becomes encrypted
by y(ls). For this purpose, the user should download each
Di =

g
x(l)
i ; d
y(l)
i

at layer l (0  l  ls), raise the ID part
of the data item to power x(ls)=x(l) and the content part to
power y(ls)=y(l) to get D0i =

g
x(ls)
i ; d
y(ls)
i

. Then, the
user further encrypts D0i using his/her own private key and
uploads Eu(D0i) =

Eu(g
x(ls)
i ); Eu(d
y(ls)
i )

, to the shuf-
fling buffer at the storage server. Similar to existing ORAM
scheme, it is required that the private-key encryption on each
data be a probabilistic encryption which gives adversary no
advantage in distinguishing data items from their appear-
4
ance.
[S3] For the jSj data items stored on the shuffling buffer, the
user performs data-oblivious sorting, based on the “new” ID
ofD0i, g
x(ls)
i . In order to perform data-oblivious sorting, any
sorting with obliviousness property can be used. For the sake
of lower cost, we can deploy the one proposed by Goodrich
in [2], which takes O(n log n) steps to finish sorting on n
data items.
[S4] After the end of data shuffling, the user further scans all
data in the data buffer to remove the private-key encryption
such that eachD0i is finally transformed back to

g
x(ls)
i ; d
y(ls)
i

.
[S5] The storage server moves the data items at the shuf-
fling buffer to the buckets at layer ls as follows: logN ran-
dom hash functions Hls

g
x(ls)
i

( 2 f1;    ; logNg) are
selected by storage server. For each hash function, stor-
age server executes the following procedure: each data item
D0i =

g
x(ls)
i ; d
y(ls)
i

is moved to one of the two buckets
generated by Hls

g
x(ls)
i

which has no less empty spaces
than the other one. Once bucket overflow happens during the
simulation, stop the execution for this hash function.
As proved in theorem 1, the probability that all logN hash
functions lead to bucket overflow will be negligible in N .
Therefore, the first hash function with none bucket overflow-
ing will be selected as the one used for ls during current data
shuffling phase, denoted as Hls

g
x(ls)
i

.
4. THE COMPLETE SCHEME
This section presents the complete scheme, called Multi-
user Oblivious RAM (M-ORAM), which is built upon C-
ORAM. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, we can see that,
M-ORAM operates in the same three phases as C-ORAM:
data query, data uploading, and data shuffling. However, the
protocol becomes more complicated due to the introduction
of anonymizers, which: (i) serve as a common proxy for
all users to access data at the storage server; (ii) maintain
shares of the system-wide secret that is used to re/encrypt
the data items before uploading them to the storage server;
and (iii) handle data shuffling if needed. In the following, we
start the description of M-ORAM with system initialization,
followed by the detailed descriptions of each phase.
4.1 System Initialization
The system initialization includes anonymizer initializa-
tion, storage initialization, and user initialization.
4.1.1 Anonymizer Initialization
Suppose there are m anonymizers, denoted as A0,    ,
Am 1, in the system. For each Ak, k = 0,    , m   1, it
is preloaded by the initialization server with the following
information:
 Two keys xk(l) and yk(l) for each l 2 f0,    , Tg,
which are randomly picked from Fp n f0g;
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User & ID dependent secret
Bucket  Query
D
a
ta
 R
e
q
u
est
D
a
ta
 R
e
p
ly
D
a
ta
 U
p
lo
a
d
in
g
D
a
ta
 S
h
u
fflin
g
:
1,1
Q
),( uA rIDE:2,1Q
)),((),(
10 uA rIDEHpospos =
:
3
Q
),,(, uu rIDEu
Bitmap  Retrieval
:
4
Q
:
1,5
Q:
2,5
Q
D
a
ta
 Q
u
e
ry
 (itera
tiv
e
ly
 fo
r e
a
ch
 n
o
n
-em
p
ty
 la
y
e
r)
)(dataEA)(dataE
ID
u
:
1
U ),( u
ID
u rdataE
:
2
U ),( uA rdataE
:
3
U )(dataEA
:
2
Q
Obtain desired data:
6
Q
Select the layer to be shuffled
Shuffle the selected layer
Figure 3: M-ORAM overview.
 Two numbers sk, zk randomly picked from Fp n f0g;
4.1.2 Storage Initialization
Same as C-ORAM, M-ORAM organizes the storage as a
hierarchy of buckets. Initially, each data itemDi = (gi; di)
is encrypted before being exported to the bottom layer of the
storage hierarchy (i.e., layer T ). The difference between M-
ORAM and C-ORAM lies in how the data item is encrypted.
In M-ORAM:
 gi is encrypted to gx(T )i , where
x(l) =
m 1Y
k=0
xk(l) for each l = 0;    ; T; (1)
and xk(l) is a secret key known to Ak only.
 di is encrypted to
 
g zi di
y(T )
, where
z =
m 1Y
k=0
zk; (2)
and
y(l) =
m 1Y
k=0
yk(l) for each l = 0;    ; T: (3)
Here, zk and yk(l) is are secrets known to Ak only.
In other words, M-ORAM encrypts each data item with the
product of secret keys from all the anonymizers. This is in
sharp contrast to C-ORAM that encrypts each data item with
the secret key known to the user.
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4.1.3 User Initialization
For each user Uj , when it joins the system, it is preloaded
by the initialization server with the following secret:
wj =
m 1Y
k=0
h(sk; j); (4)
where h(:; :) is a public one-way hash function that maps
two elements of Fp to another element of the same field, and
is known to all users, anonymizers, and the storage server.
4.2 Phase 1: Data Query
Same as C-ORAM, in order for user Uj to obtain a desired
data item Di = (gi; di) from the storage server, M-ORAM
executes the data query phase in an iterative manner at each
nonempty layer l of the storage hierarchy from the top layer
l = 0 to the bottom layer l = T . Each iteration consists of
six steps from [Q1] to [Q6].
[Q1] The goal of this step is to compute the encrypted ID
of the desired data item. However, different from C-ORAM,
which uses the secret key of an individual user as the en-
cryption key, M-ORAM uses the product of all anonymiz-
ers’ secret keys as the encryption key. Therefore, [Q1] in
M-ORAM requires a collaboration between the user and the
anonymizers, as shown in Figure 4. It consists of two sub-
steps as follows.
0
A
1
A 1−mA Server
1,1
Q
2,1
Q
ju
Figure 4: Generation of encrypted data ID in M-ORAM.
[Q1.1] In the first sub-step, user Uj sends the following mes-
sage to anonymizer A0:

Uj ; g
rj;0wj
i ; (gij)
wj ; 
rj;1
j

; (5)
where rj;0 and rj;1 are two nonces randomly picked from
Fp n f0g, j is an element randomly picked from group Gp,
and wj is a secret preloaded to Uj .
[Q1.2] Upon receiving the message, each anonymizer Ak
(k = 0;    ;m  1) updates it and forwards to Ak+1:
*
Uj ;

g
rj;0wj
i
 Qkt=0 xt(l)Qk
t=0 h(st;j) ;
 
(gij)
wj
Qkt=0 yt(l)ztQk
t=0 h(st;j) ;


rj;1
j
Qk
t=0 zt
+
:
(6)
Note that xk(l), yk(l), zk, and sk are secrets preloaded to
Ak. After the message has traversed the entire anonymizer
chain, it becomes
*
Uj ;

g
rj;0wj
i
 Qm 1t=0 xt(l)Qm 1
t=0 h(st;j) ;
 
(gij)
wj
Qm 1t=0 yt(l)ztQm 1
t=0 h(st;j) ;


rj;1
j
Qm 1
t=0 zt
+
=
*
Uj ;

g
rj;0wj
i
 x(l)
wj ;
 
(gij)
wj
 y(l)zwj ;rj;1j z
+
=
D
Uj ; g
rj;0x(l)
i ; (gij)
y(l)z
; j
rj;1z
E
;
(7)
according to Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). Then, Am 1
 keeps the (gij)y(l)z locally, which will be used in step
[Q5: Data Reply], and
 returns the following message:
D
Uj ; g
rj;0x(l)
i ; j
rj;1z
E
back to Uj .
Upon receiving the message, Uj can obtain g
x(l)
i and j
z
from grj;0x(l)i and j
rj;1z , respectively, as rj;0 and rj;1 are
its self-generated nonces. Note that gx(l)i is the ID of the de-
sired data item encrypted with the product of all anonymiz-
ers’ secret keys, which will be used in [Q2]. jz will be used
in [Q5: Data Reply].
[Q2] Based on gx(l)i , the user computes the positions pos0
and pos1 of the buckets that may contain the desired data
item:
(pos0; pos1)  Hl

g
x(l)
i

:
This step is the same as that in C-ORAM.
[Q3: Bitmap Retrieval] This step is the same as that in C-
ORAM. The goal is to retrieve the bitmap that will be used
by the user to decide the buckets to request.
[Q4: Bucket Request] This step is the same as that in C-
ORAM. The goal is to allow the user to select the buckets to
request based on the retrieved bitmap, and send the request
directly to the storage server.
[Q5: Data Reply] In response to the bucket request from
Uj , the storage server returns all the data items at the re-
quested buckets to Uj in two sub-steps: [Q5.1: From Server
to Anonymizers] and [Q5.2: From Anonymizers to User], as
shown in Figure 5.
0
A
1
A
1−mA Server
2,5
Q
1,5
Q
ju
Figure 5: Data reply in M-ORAM.
[Q5.1] The storage server returns each encrypted data item
in the requested buckets to anonymizer Am 1 in the follow-
ing format: 
g
x(l)
i0 ; (g
 z
i0 di0)
y(l)

: (8)
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[Q5.2] Am 1 first updates the second component of the pair
by multiplying it with (gij)y(l)z (which it has learned at the
end of [Q1.2]): 
g
x(l)
i0 ; (g
 z
i0 g
z
i di0
z
j )
y(l)

: (9)
Then, each anonymizer Ak (k = m   1;    ; 0) updates it
and forwards to Ak 1:0BB@gx(l)i0 
1Qm 1
t=k
xt(l) ;

(g
 z
i0 g
z
i di0
z
j )
y(l)
Qm 1t=k h(st;j)Qm 1
t=k
yt(l)
1CCA : (10)
Note that xk(l), yk(l), and sk are secrets preloaded to Ak.
After the message has traversed the entire anonymizer chain,
it becomes0BB@gx(l)i0 
1Qm 1
t=0 xt(l) ;

(g
 z
i0 g
z
i di0
z
j )
y(l)
Qm 1t=0 h(st;j)Qm 1
t=0 yt(l)
1CCA
=

gi0 ;

g
 z
i0 g
z
i di0
z
j
wj
;
(11)
according to Equations (1), (3), and (4). Then, A0 returns
the data item to Uj .
[Q6: Obtain Desired Data] If the ID of the returned data
item matches gi (meaning that i = i0), Uj performs the fol-
lowing computation to the second component of the pair: (i)
raising it to the power of 1wj (where wj was preloaded to
Uj); and (ii) dividing it by zj (which Uj has learned at the
end of [Q1.2]). As a result, the second component of the pair
has become:   
g zi0 g
z
i di0
z
j
wj 1wj
zj
= di; (12)
which is exactly the content of Uj’s desired data item. For
other returned data items whose ID does not match gi, they
are stored in a local buffer at the user.
4.3 Phase 2: Data Uploading
The data uploading phase inM-ORAM also becomes more
complicated as it involves the anonymizers. As shown in
Figure 6, it now consists of three steps as follows.
0
A
1
A 1−mA Server
1
U
2
U
3
U
ju
Figure 6: Data uploading in M-ORAM.
[U1] In order to re-encrypt and then upload a data itemDi0 =
(gi0 ; di0) to the storage server, Uj first picks two elements
rj;2 and rj;3 uniformly at random from Fq n f0g, and sends
the following message to A0:D
g
x(l)
i0 ; (di0g
 z
i0 g
z
i )
wjrj;3); g
rj;2
i
E
: (13)
[U2]Upon receiving the message, each anonymizerAk (k =
0;    ;m  1) updates it and forwards to Ak+1:*
g
x(l)
i0
Qkt=0 xnewt (l)Qk
t=0 xt(l) ;

(di0g
 z
i0 g
z
i )
wjrj;3
 Qkt=0 ynewt (l)Qk
t=0 h(st;j) ;

g
rj;2
i
Qk
t=0 y
new
t (l)zt

;
(14)
where xnewk (l) and y
new
k (l) are the new keys selected by Ak
for re-encryption. Note that zk and sk are secrets preloaded
toAk. After the message has traversed the entire anonymizer
chain, it becomes
*
g
x(l)
i0
Qm 1t=0 xnewt (l)Qm 1
t=0 xt(l) ;

(di0g
 z
i0 g
z
i )
wjrj;3
 Qm 1t=0 ynewt (l)Qm 1
t=0 h(st;j) ;

g
rj;2
i
Qm 1
t=0 y
new
t (l)zt
+
=

g
xnew(l)
i0 ; (di0g
 z
i0 g
z
i )
ynew(l)rj;3 ; g
rj;2zy
new(l)
i

;
(15)
which is returned to Uj by Am 1.
[U3]Upon receiving the message,Uj extracts the re-encrypted
data ID:
g
xnew(l)
i0 ;
and performs the following computation:h
(di0g
 z
i0 g
z
i )
ynew(l)rj;3
i1=rj;3 h
g
rj;2zy
new(l)
i
i  1rj;2
to obtain
(di0g
 z
i0 )
ynew(l);
which is the re-encrypted data content. Then, the re-encrypted
data item

g
xnew(l)
i0 ; (di0g
 z
i0 )
ynew(l)

is uploaded to a tempo-
rary shuffling buffer at the storage server.
4.4 Phase 3: Data Shuffling
As in C-ORAM, data shuffling is also conducted in the
five steps. However, it differs from the data shuffling in C-
ORAM in two aspects:
 Shuffling is performed by anonymizers not the user.
 As there are multiple anonymizers, Steps 2, 3 and 4
should be conducted by all the anonymizers collabora-
tively. Also since anonymizers may be compromised,
extra measures should be taken to protect the mapping
between data items before and after shuffling from be-
ing known to any proper set of all the anonymizers.
This way, the mapping is kept secret if at least one
anonymizer is not compromised.
The following data shuffling algorithm outlines the differ-
ences for data shuffling in M-ORAM from that in C-ORAM
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(especially, S2, S3 and S4). Each anonymizer Ak will ex-
ecute S2, S3 and S4 completely, until all of them finish the
execution. In order of simplicity, we denote the data Di be-
fore Ak raises its ID and content to xk(ls) and yk(ls) asDki ,
therefore, the initial data Di can be represented as D0i .
Algorithm 2 Data Shuffling in M-ORAM
S1: Determine Shuffling Layer
1: l := 0
2: S := S [ S0
3: while l < jSj do
4: S := S [ Sl+1
5: l := l+ 1
6: end while
7: ls := l
8: for k := 0 tom  1 do
S2: Data Encryption
9: forDki 2 S do
10: Ak .Download(S,Dki )
11: Dk+1i := Ak .Transform((D
k
i ;
xk(ls)
xk(l)
;
yk(ls)
yk(l)
))
12: EAk (D
k+1
i ) := Ak .Encrypt(D
k+1
i , Ak)
13: Ak .Upload(S, EAk (D
k+1
i ))
14: end for
S3: Data Sorting
15: Ak .Obliviously-Sort(S)
S4: Data Decryption
16: forDk+1i 2 S do
17: Ak .Download(S, EAk (D
k+1
i ))
18: Dk+1i := Decrypt(D
k+1
i , Ak)
19: Ak .Upload(S,Dk+1i )
20: end for
21: end for
S5: Server Locates Data into Buckets
22: Server.Map(ls, S)
Specifically, all data items at layers 0;    ; ls should be
updated through the collaboration of all anonymizers, such
that the ID of each data item becomes encrypted by x(ls) and
the content of each data item becomes encrypted by y(ls). In
addition, all the n data items in the shuffling buffer should
be randomly permuted.
Therefore, for each anonymizer Ak, it actually does the
following:
[S2] Ak first downloads Dki from the shuffling buffer and
raises the ID part of the data item to power xk(ls)=xk(l)
and the content part to power yk(ls)=yk(l) (Notice, after all
anonymizers have updated accordingly,Di will be in form of
(g
x(ls)
i ; (g
 z
i di)
y(ls))). Then, the updated data item will be
encrypted by Ak’s private key and uploaded to the shuffling
buffer at the storage server. Let denote the total number of
data items stored at the shuffling buffer as n.
[S3]Ak performs data shuffling based onDk+1i ’s data ID by
adopting Goodrich’s randomized shellsort algorithm.
[S4] After data shuffling, Ak removes the private-key en-
cryption on data and uploads the data back to the shuffling
buffer.
As a result, since not all of the anonymizers can be com-
promised, the overall data shuffling is data-oblivious shuf-
fling guaranteed by the non-compromised anonymizers.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed
C-ORAM and M-ORAM schemes.
5.1 Security of C-ORAM
Our proposed C-ORAM follows the existing hierarchical,
bucket-based, and hash function-based ORAMs [1], with the
following major differences: (i) a balanced mapping mech-
anism is designed to map data items to buckets during the
shuffling process; (ii) as retrieved data items are removed
from their buckets, empty buckets may be left at layers, and
therefore a bitmap is requested from the storage before re-
trieving any bucket at a non-empty layer. Hence, it is nec-
essary to show the new mapping mechanism can ensure a
negligible bucket overflow probability, and the probability of
failure in locating non-empty buckets during the data query
process is also negligible.
5.1.1 Probability of Bucket Overflow
Theorem 1. For any layer l, no buckets on l will overflow
with very high probability after data shuffling. To be more
specific, 81  l  L,
Pr[Buckets overflow on layer l]  O(N  log logN ): (16)
The proof sketch of this theorem is presented at Appendix
1.
5.1.2 Failure Probability in Locating Non-empty Buck-
ets during Data Query
Theorem 2. AmongX buckets arbitrarily selected from layer
l, the probability for all the buckets to be empty is at most
e 
X
c , where c = 8 log logN  (4 log logN + 1).
Proof. For each layer l < T , the number of buckets at the
layer is nl = 2l+1 logN log logN . According to the design
of C-ORAM, when a shuffling process has just been con-
ducted for the layer, the layer should have at least nl 1 data
items. After that, the number keeps decreasing until the next
time a shuffling process is conducted for the layer. So, the
number may reach the minimum value right before a shuf-
fling process begins. The minimum value can be estimated
as
nl 1
4 log logN + 1
due to the following reasons: (i) the condition to trigger a
shuffling process for layer l is that the number of data items
at layers 0;    ; l   1 has reached or exceeded nl 1; (ii) the
data items at layers 0;    ; l   1 were brought from layer
l;    ; T ; (iii) in the worst case, a fraction 14 log logN+1 of
the above data items were brought from layer l, which could
happen if 8 log logN data items (in two buckets) from to-
gether and only 2 date items (in two buckets) from layer T
were brought to layers 0;    ; l   1 after each of the past
queries. If all the minimum number of data items at layer
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l fill as few buckets as possible according to theorem 1, the
number of non-empty buckets is at least
nl 1
4 log logN(4 log logN + 1)
Hence, for a randomly selected bucket Bk in layer l, the
probability for the bucket to be non-empty is
Pr[Bk is non-empty]
 nl 1
4nl log logN(4 log logN + 1)
=
1
8 log logN  (4 log logN + 1)
=
1
c
:
(17)
For layer T , if it stores at least N data items initially, the
minimum number of data items that should stay at the layer
is N2 , because all data items should be shuffled to this layer
as long as the number of data items at layers 0;    ; T   1
reaches or exceeds nT 1 (i.e., N2 ). Hence, the non-empty
probability for an arbitrary bucket Bk at layer T is
Pr[Bk is non-empty]

N
2
4N log logN
=
1
8 log logN
 1
c
:
(18)
Therefore, the probability for all X arbitrary buckets at a
layer l to be empty is
Pr[all X buckets are empty at layer l]
 (1  1
c
)X = (1  1
c
)c
X
c  e Xc :
(19)
Corollary 3. The probability for C-ORAM to fail in finding
two non-empty buckets to query in steps Q3 is negligible.
Proof. In the data query phase of C-ORAM, two buckets
should be queried at each non-empty layer. In step Q3 of
C-ORAM, a bitmap of
minf2l; 8 log logN(4 log logN + 1)g logN log logN
bits should be retrieved. According to Theorem 2, the proba-
bility for all the buckets represented by these bits to be empty
is negligible, i.e., at most O(N  log logN ).
5.2 Security of M-ORAM
The purpose of M-ORAM is to protect the access pattern
of an innocent user from being revealed to the adversary who
has control on a user and some but not all anonymizers. In
the following, we first define a game to formally specify
the desired property of access pattern protection, based on
which, we then present a theorem that quantifies the privacy
preservation capability of our proposed scheme and describe
the proof of the theorem.
5.2.1 Game Definition: Formal Description of Ac-
cess Pattern Protection
A game G(N;m) between a challenger (who stands for
an innocent user and non-compromised anonymizers) and an
adversary (who controls a user, the storage server and some
anonymizers) is defined as follows.
 Initialization: The challenger initializes the storage server,
the N exported data items, the chain of m anonymiz-
ers, and two users including user U0 who is innocent
and U1 who is controlled by the adversary.
 Phase I Queries: The adversary can make any number
of queries of the following types.
Anonymizer Compromising: The adversary requests to
compromise an anonymizer. Then, the information owned
by the compromised anonymizer and its behaviors will
be controlled by the adversary. However, we require at
least one of them anonymizers not be compromised.
U0’s data access: The adversary requests U0 to query
a data item, and the related processes of data request,
reply, upload, and shuffling are performed accordingly.
The adversary may specify the queried data item to be
either (i) a random one that has not been queried by
U0, or (ii) a specific one that has already been queried
by U0. However, the adversary cannot specify a data
ID for U0 to query.
Bucket inspection: The adversary specifies a bucket,
and the challenger returns all the data items stored at
the bucket.
U1’s data access: U1 (controlled by the adversary) ap-
pears to query a data item, and the related processes
of data request, reply, upload, and shuffling are per-
formed. Before each query, U1 may request an ID of
data item that it has not queried before; in response, a
data ID is randomly picked and provided.
 Selection I: the adversary requestsU0 to arbitrarily query
a data item, denoted as 0.
 Phase II Queries: same as the Phase I. Note that, the
adversary may request U0 to query 0, which it has
queried during the Selection I phase.
 Selection II: the adversary requests U0 to arbitrarily
query a data item, denoted as 1.
 Phase III Queries: same as the Phase I. Also note that,
the adversary may request U0 to query 0 or 1.
 Challenge: The challenger randomly decides a binary
bit b, and then requests U0 to query data item b.
 Phase IV Queries: same as the Phase III queries, ex-
cept that the adversary is not allowed to directly spec-
ify 0 or 1 to query, but is allowed to specify b or
1 b to query.
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 Response: the adversary returns a binary bit b0 as a
guess of the b chosen by the challenger at the challenge
phase.
The adversary wins the game if b0 = b; otherwise, it loses.
The advantage for the adversary to win the game is defined
as jPr[b = b0]  1=2j.
5.2.2 Security Property of Our Scheme
The security property of our proposed complete scheme is
formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If there is an algorithmA that can win the game
G(p;m) with an advantage  in time t, then an algorithm
B can be developed to solve the following matching Diffie-
Hellman problem in group Gp with advantage  in time
O(t2): Consider a multiplicative cyclic group Gp of order p
and generator g. Given ga0 , ga1 , gc, and (garc; ga1 rc), for
some a0, a1 and c randomly picked from Fp and a binary bit
r randomly picked from f0; 1g, determine r.
A proof sketch of the theorem is presented at Appendix 2.
6. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the communication and
storage overhead of the proposed M-ORAM scheme. As
M-ORAM involves three parties: users, anonymizers, and
server, we analyze the overhead from the following aspects.
Recall that there is a total of
T + 1 = dlogN   log(logN log logN)e
layers in the storage hierarchy, each layer l has
l = 2
l+1 logN log logN
buckets, and each bucket can store up to B = 4 log logN
data blocks.
User’s Query Overhead (qu(N)): For each query, the user
needs to retrieve two buckets from each layer, together with
an X-bit string from the bitmap, where X is
minf2l+1; 16 log logN(4 log logN + 1)g logN log logN:
In a typical file system, the data block size usually is 64KB
or 256KB. This means that, as long as there is a total of
N < 264  1020 or N < 2128  1040 data items in the
system, the X-bit string can be fit into a single data block;
hence, the communication overhead for the bitmap retrieval
is negligible. Therefore, in such realistic file systems, the
query overhead for the user is (in the unit of data block):
qu(N) < 2  T B  8 logN log logN: (20)
Anonymizer’s Query Overhead (qA(N)): For each query,
each data item needs to go through every anonymizer. Thus,
the query overhead for each anoynmizer is the same with
user’s query overhead without the bitmap retrieval. There-
fore, we have:
qA(N) < qu(N): (21)
User’s Shuffling Overhead (su(N)): InM-ORAM, the user
is not responsible for data shuffling. Thus, we have:
su(N) = 0: (22)
Anonymizer’s Shuffling Overhead (sA(N)): InM-ORAM,
data shuffling at layer l is triggered only if the total number
of data items on all higher layers exceeds l 1. On the other
hand, each time when a user accesses the storage server, at
most qA(N) data items will be inserted into the top layer
(i.e., layer 0). This means that, data shuffling at layer l is trig-
gered every lqA(N) = 2
l accesses. Moreover, as M-ORAM
employs randomized shellsort to perform data shuffling, the
overhead for shuffling l buckets at layer l is O (l log l).
Therefore, the amortized communication overhead for data
shuffling at layer l is:
slA(N) < O

l log l
2l

: (23)
Overall, the communication overhead incurred by data shuf-
fling has the following upper bound:
sA(N) =
lX
l=0
slA(N) <
TX
l=0
O

l log l
2l

= O(log3N log logN):
(24)
User’s Cache and Storage Overhead: As explained in the
detailed description of M-ORAM in Section 4, each user
needs to maintain a O(logN log logN) cache during data
retrieval but zero permanent storage.
Server’s Storage Overhead: The storage server needs to
maintain a hierarchy of buckets, with a size ofO(N log logN).
Table 6 compares M-ORAM against the best-performance
single-user ORAM [7] (to our knowledge).
Table 1: Overhead Comparison
Overhead Best single-user ORAM M-ORAM
Query User O(
log2 N
log logN ) O(logN log logN)
Anonymizer N.A. O(logN log logN)
Shuffling User O(
log2 N
log logN ) N.A.
Anonymizer N.A. O(log3N log logN)
Client Cache O(1) O(logN log logN)
Client Storage O(1) O(1)
Server Storage O(N) O(N log logN)
7. RELATEDWORK
Numerous ORAM schemes have been proposed in the
past decade to protect a single user’s access pattern privacy.
One type of ORAM schemes use indices as the major data-
locating technique, such as [10, 11]. Indices can be stored
at the user side or outsourced to the storage server, which
incurs either storage overhead at the user side or communi-
cation overhead between the user and server. The scheme
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proposed in [10] achieves O(log3N) worst-case communi-
cation overhead with constant local storage. The one pro-
posed in [11] achieves asymptotical O(logN) communica-
tion overhead withO(
p
N) local storage, under the assump-
tion that there is a total of N  234 data items.
Another type of ORAM schemes are based on hash func-
tions. Two hash based schemes were proposed by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [1]: a square-root scheme withO(
p
N logN)
communication overhead and O(
p
N) local storage, and a
hierarchical scheme with O(log3N) communication over-
head and constant local storage. Since then, many advanced
hash based ORAM schemes have been proposed: a cuckoo-
hash based ORAM [9], a Bloom-filter based ORAM [12],
and a few hybrid schemes [3–5, 7] based on hybrid struc-
tures of bucket-hash and cuckoo-hash with stashes. In all of
the hybrid schemes, a bucket-hash data structure is used at
the top of the ORAM and a cuckoo-hash data structure with
stash is used at the bottom to ensure the overflow probability
during data reshuffling to be negligible. Among all the hash
based ORAM schemes, the one proposed in [7] yields the
best performance with O

log2N
log logN

worst-case communi-
cation overhead and constant local storage.
Unfortunately, none of the above schemes supports mul-
tiple users in the system. If they are applied directly to a
multi-user system, an adversary user can easily obtain the
data access patterns of other users by colluding with the stor-
age server. In contrast, our proposed M-ORAM can handle
multiple users (who may not trust each other) by introduc-
ing anonymizers as a new component into the system. We
have proved that M-ORAM can protect a user’s data access
pattern privacy from other users and the storage server as
long as at least one of the anonymizers is not compromised.
There have been a few works on multi-user ORAM [6, 13].
However, their studies focused on how to support multiple
users to access the shared storage server and deal with the
associated concurrency issues, based on the assumption that
all users trust each other, which differs significantly from the
focus of our study.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper proposesMulti-user ORAM (M-ORAM), a new
type of ORAM system, in which a chain of anonymizers is
introduced to act as a common proxy between users and the
storage server, and therefore users can be securely isolated
from each other and the compromise of some but not all
anonymizers can be tolerated. Consequently, the design can
protect the data access pattern of each individual user from
others, as long as not all anonymizers are compromised. Ex-
tensive security and overhead analysis has been conducted
to quantify the strength of the scheme in protecting individ-
ual user’s access pattern and the costs incurred to provide the
protection.
In the future, we plan to improve the performance of the
current design. Potential directions include (i) optimizing
the shuffling algorithm to reduce the data shuffling cost, and
(ii) optimizing the design of data mapping mechanism to de-
crease the bucket size and hence reduce the cost for both
query and shuffling.
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Appendix 1: Proof Sketch for Theorem 1
Proof. In C-ORAM, the capacity of each layer l is l =
2l+1 logN log logN . If we set the bucket size of layer l
to be Bl = 4 log log l, the bucket overflow probability for
layer l can be estimated as:
Pr[Bucket overflow on layer l] = O(
1
l
); (25)
according to the layered induction method adopted in [8].
Hence, when we set the bucket size as
B = max
l
fBlg = 4 log log T = 4 log logN; (26)
the bucket overflow probability for each layer can be bounded
by the maximum value of the overflow probability over all
layers. Therefore, we have:
Pr[Bucket overflow for every layer]
max
l
fPr[Bucket overflow on layer l]g
=O(
1
0
)
=O(
1
2 logN log logN
):
(27)
Notice that, the upper the layer is, the higher the overflow
probability is. However, in case of overflow happening, two
new random hash functions can be selected to re-hash all
data on the shuffled layer until there is no bucket overflowed
on it, as described in the scheme. To guarantee bucket over-
flow probability to be negligible in N , at most logN pairs
of hash functions for the shuffled layer need to be selected.
In this case, the probability of all logN pairs resulting in
bucket overflow on the selected layer will be:
Pr[Bucket overflows on all logN hash functions]
O(( 1
2 logN log logN
)logN )
=O(N  log logN ):
(28)
Notice that, as shown in equation 28, the bucket overflow
probability on the selected layer, whichever the layer is, is
upper bounded by O(N  log logN ). Different from existing
bucket-hash ORAMs, for each non-empty bucket, it can be
accessed only once and marked as empty before the layer is
shuffled. Therefore, the security flaw pointed out in [7] does
not appear in C-ORAM.
Appendix 2: Proof for Theorem 4
Proof. The proof is conducted in two steps: first, the con-
struction of algorithm B which leverages the game G(p;m)
to solve the matching Diffie-Hellman problem; second, rea-
soning about the advantage of B in solving the matching
Diffie-Hellman problem.
Matching Diffie-Hellman Problem (MDHP): Let g be
a group generator with order N . Let a0; a1; c0; c1 2R ZN
and b 2R f0; 1g. Given tuple (ga0 ; ga1 ; ga0c0 ; ga1c1), to de-
cide the following tuple (gcb ; gc1 b ), i.e., to find b is a hard
problem.
Notice theMDHPwill degrade to Decisional Diffie-Hellman
Problem (DDHP) if c0 and c1 are the same, however, as
MDHP is equivalent to DDHP, we still use MDHP without
loss of generality.
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In the first step, we show how to construct algorithm B,
which is provided with the input of the MDHP and acts as
the challenger to play the game G(p;m) with the adversary
algorithm A.
In the initialization phase, B initializes the storage server
by establishing N data items, m anonymizers with restric-
tion that at least one of them cannot be compromised. As in-
dicated above, a0 and a1 are two data IDs among the database
which are chosen according to the input of the MDHP from
f0;    ; N   1g.
At selection I query phase, A is able to make any number
of “legal” queries (including arrogating B to make queries,
asking compromised user to make queries) such that B needs
to respond. Then, at selection I phase, B launches the query
of data item of ID ga0 . Similarly, A acts similarly in phase
II query and B launches the query of the data item of ID ga1
in selection II phase. Before the challenge phase, A can still
make any number of “legal” queries which are the same as
phase I and phase II queries.
At the challenge phase, B uniform randomly picks up a
data ID gab to query, where b is randomly picked up from
f0; 1g by B. After the query by B was made in the chal-
lenge phase, it will send the transcript of the query to data
items whose ID is gab to A. Now, A is able to make the last
“legal” query phase, phase IV query, with the exception that
it is now unable to specify ga0 and ga1 directly as it cannot
identify these two data items after encryption (ga0c and ga1c)
and data shuffling. However, it is allowed to ask the users to
query those two data items, whose IDs are denoted as gab
and ga1 b .
When A finishes phase IV query, it will need to return its
guess on b as b0 and return b0 back to B, then, this will be
used by B as the answer to the original MDHP.
Notice in the challenge phase, B cannot obtain gar or
ga1 r from the provided garc and ga1 rc (also note that only
gc, not c, is unknown by B), we adopt the following trick
in the game. Right after the last time when the data item
of either ID ga0 or ID ga1 is queried before the challenge
phase, the data items associated with these two IDs are both
brought into the shuffling buffer. Then, during the follow-up
shuffling processes, the anonymizer that is not allowed to be
compromised always uses c or kc (where k is known by B)
to encrypt data items, which makes the data items associated
with IDs ga0 and ga1 to become associated with encrypted
IDs gar and ga1 r , with an unknown matching relation be-
tween them. Thus, using garc as encrypted ID in a query
will result in the query of the data item of actual ID gar .
Note that our proposed scheme allows B to launch a query
based on either an actual or encrypted data ID. In the former
case, anonymizers are used to facilitate the translation from
the actual ID to the encrypted ID; while in the latter case,
results obtained from anonymizers are not really used.
In the second step, let’s look at the B’s advantage in solv-
ing MDHP if A wins the game G(N;m) with an advantage
of  in time O(t), After investigate the construction of B,
when b = 0, B launches a query for the data item with ID
ga0 in the challenge phase. If A wins the game, it should
respond b0 = 0, which is the correct value of b. When b = 1,
B launches a query for the data item with ID ga0 in the chal-
lenge phase, accordingly. If A wins the game, it should re-
spond b0 = 1, which is also the correct value of b. Therefore,
whenA wins the game, B will also provide a correct answer
to the MDHP, and vice versa.
The time complexity of B can also be analyzed and the
result is O(t2) if A needs time t to win the game.
13
